We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous and nonconstant over the set of values for which the good has a positive chance of provision. Piecewise-linear strategies are our special focus. We characterize the distributions of players' private values that can support a continuous piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium, and we calculate such equilibria for these distributions. Allowing the seller to charge a nonrefundable entry fee before players make their private contributions, we show these piecewise-linear equilibria can maximize the seller's expected utility, which may include an altruistic component, over all incentive compatible selling mechanisms. Complementing the possible optimality of the subscription game, we show that the mechanism in which players' contributions are not refunded is generically suboptimal.
inject resources to "grease the wheels" of the public good provision problem, a possibility that is ruled out by the other authors' budget-balance conditions.
A necessary preliminary step in our analysis is to sharpen the existing equilibrium characterization results. We study a two-player subscription game in which players' values for the public good are private information, characterized by a continuous distribution function. 6 We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous and nonconstant over the set of values for which the good has a positive chance of provision. Our analysis completes the results in Menezes et al. (2001) and Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , and it connects and contrasts them with those in Martimort and Moreira (2007) . Beyond our general characterization, we are particularly interested in equilibrium strategies that are piecewise-linear and are also strictly increasing over some interval of values. We show that for linear equilibria to exist, players' values must be distributed according to an exponential distribution that does not include zero in its support or a reverse power function distribution (of which the uniform distribution is a special case). 7 Cornelli (1996) adapted Myerson's (1981) method of optimal auction design to characterize an optimal incentive compatible mechanism for the sale of a discrete public good. Within our framework, we show that, for the exponential and reverse power function distributions, the piecewise-linear equilibria of the subscription game (possibly with the introduction of nonrefundable entry fees) achieve the expected payoff of an optimal mechanism for the seller; and if such piecewise-linear equilibria do not exist, then the subscription game cannot be an optimal mechanism for the seller. When piecewise-linear equilibria exist, we calculate the seller's optimal completion threshold and entry fee. We conclude by establishing a generic suboptimality result for the contribution game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines "regular" equilibria and provides a general characterization result. In Section 3 we completely characterize regular piecewise-linear equilibria. Section 4 contains our main result on the optimality of the subscription game and relates it to the existing literature and to the contribution game. In particular, we show that the scope for optimality of the contribution game is very limited. Section 5 concludes.
The subscription game
Two players, 1 and 2, simultaneously contribute any positive amount to the funding of a public good.
Player i's value for the good is v i , i = 1, 2. Values v 1 and v 2 are independently distributed random variables 6 All previous analysis with private information and continuous contributions have also used a two-player model. 7 There are other distributions that also support such piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies, but they would differ from the two families named only over types where (i) a player has no chance of obtaining the good or (ii) a player is sure he will obtain the good. These alternative distributions must agree with an exponential or reverse power function distribution over the interval of values where the piecewise-linear strategy is strictly increasing.
with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F , which has support [v,v] , where 0 ≤ v <v ≤ ∞. A player's realized value is known only to that player. We suppose F is absolutely continuous, with density function f that is continuous on (v,v) . The third actor in the model is the collector, who ex ante specifies a contribution threshold t and provides the public good if and only if contributions total at least t. The cost of the public good is c, known to the collector and both players.
In the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991) , we consider the subscription game: players' contributions are refunded if they are insufficient to cover t; the collector retains contributions exceeding t. The two players are risk neutral. If the good is provided, then the payoff to player i is v i − (player i's contribution). If the good is not provided, then the payoff to player i is 0. While the collector is very important in our analysis, for the remainder of this section we focus on the players' strategic behavior for a fixed threshold t. We postpone until Section 4 the description of the collector's payoffs and optimal choice of t.
The foregoing description is common knowledge among the players and the collector. We focus on symmetric equilibrium strategies (s, s) such that completion happens with ex ante positive probability. In this case, standard arguments show t < 2v and s is nondecreasing over all types having a positive probability of provision.
At this point some additional notation is useful. Definev as the lowest type who contributes the maximum under s, and define v as the lowest type who contributes t − s(v). For simplicity, our characterization is for strategies s that achieve their maxima at finitev. Because the interim probability of completion for type v ∈ [v, v) is zero, little more can be said about the shape of s on [v, v) . To avoid uninteresting complications, we set s = 0 in this range. Lemmas 1-3 in Laussel and Palfrey (2003) establish that on [ v,v] a symmetric equilibrium contribution function s is non-decreasing and almost everywhere differentiable. A first possibility is that s is a step function. If an appropriate boundary condition, later given in (4), is satisfied, then the following strategy constitutes the "halvesies" ,v] . Also, Menezes et al. (2001) point out that, for t <v, the "all-or-nothing" equilibrium is sure to exist:
where v * solves vF (v) = t. As will be seen later, however, if the subscription game is to be an optimal mechanism for the seller, then strategies must be continuous and strictly increasing in the region where a 8 The characterization can be extended to cases wherev = ∞ by replacing s(v) with the appropriate limiting value of s. For the piecewise-linear equilibria studied below,v is necessarily finite.
player's chance of obtaining the good is strictly between 0 and 1. These considerations lead us to focus on "regular" equilibria. Definition 1. A symmetric equilibrium (s, s) is called regular if s is continuous and nonconstant on [ v,v] .
Note that neither the halvesies equilibrium nor the all-or-nothing equilibrium is regular. Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (b) ) establish that in a regular equilibrium s must be strictly increasing on [ v,v] ; furthermore, v andv are not at all arbitrary, but rather are jointly determined as part of the equilibrium.
We now characterize regular equilibria. 
is a regular symmetric equilibrium to the subscription game with threshold t if and only if s and G are differentiable on ( v,v) and satisfy all of the following conditions:
and further, if
Conditions a-d describe a candidate strategy for a regular symmetric equilibrium. Condition a rules out the possibility that s is constant on [ v,v] (the halvesies equilibrium satisfies b-d because v =v = t/2 so the interval ( v,v) is empty). Since s is strictly increasing on ( v,v) , the definition of G implies that, in equilibrium, type v ∈ ( v,v) will see the threshold for completion reached if and only if the other player's type is at least as large as G(v). et al. (2001) showed that a continuous equilibrium to the subscription game must satisfy (1) and (2). The value of Proposition 1 is that, with the addition of the boundary conditions (3) and (4), it completes their equilibrium characterization. Our proposition also shows that continuity of the equilibrium strategy over [ v,v] implies differentiability over ( v,v) . The reader may be curious why the inequality in (4) applies only in the case where v > v. This condition says that a player contributing the maximum, s(v),
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should not strictly benefit by contributing t (thereby ensuring the good is provided). This condition is not included when v = v because in that case it is automatically satisfied. To see this, observe that if v = v, then s(v) + s(v) = t, so that a player contributing s(v) is assured the good will be provided-hence, there is no profitable deviation to the (possibly) larger contribution t.
In their Proposition 1, Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , with a different approach, provide conditions characterizing equilibrium equivalent to our conditions (1)-(3). The only substantive difference between our characterization and Laussel and Palfrey's is that we further impose condition (4). 9 We believe our condition (4) clarifies and sharpens the characterization of equilibria. To see this, suppose valuations are distributed on [0, 1] with density f (v) = 2(1 − v), and consider the halvesies strategy described above. Apparently, all conditions in Laussel and Palfrey's Proposition 1 are satisfied. However, one may verify that typev prefers to deviate to the full contribution of t as soon as t < 3 − √ 5. Equivalently, our condition (4) is not satisfied for t < 3 − √ 5. This is because the local first-order condition (1), obtained through the Revelation Principle, does not eliminate contributions outside the range of s as more profitable. Our condition (4) provides a simple test for global optimality of s. Indeed, to the local first-order condition (1), one simply needs to add the constraint that completing the project on one's own is not profitable. Moreover, whenv < ∞, condition (4) will hold for any v ≥v if and only if it holds forv, thereby providing a further sharpening of the equilibrium characterization. Martimort and Moreira (2007) point out the similarity between the equilibrium characterization of their common agency game and the results in Menezes et al. (2001) ; therefore the similarity extends to our Proposition 1. Martimort and Moreira are interested in equilibria that, in our framework, are regular and satisfy 0 < s (v) < ∞ for all v. They show existence of such equilibria, withv =v, under the additional assumption that
In this case, one can show that our condition (4) is automatically satisfied for such regular equilibria. However, there exist many regular equilibria that do not satisfy the condition 0 < s (v) < ∞ at v =v, as Figure 1 in Alboth et al. (2001) illustrates.
Regular equilibria with a flat spot at the top, that is withv <v, also play an important role in our optimality results. Indeed, in Section 3 we exhibit examples of regular equilibria (s, s) withv <v and s(v) < t. It is worth noting that such equilibria are not considered in any of the papers in the literature on the subscription game, with the exception of Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (b) ) for the specific case of a uniform distribution of valuations. 10 The characterization in Proposition 1 can be used to refine our understanding of regular equilibria, especially of those exhibiting a flat spot at the top. A straightforward but tedious application of the contraction mapping theorem demonstrates that, if v > 0 and f ∈ C 1 , a regular equilibrium with a flat spot at the top is sure to exist for t sufficiently small. More interesting is the following proposition showing thatv <v is incompatible with v > v because the latter implies, by condition (4), that s( v) = v. This result considerably sharpens the equilibrium characterization: One of the extremes of the interval [ v,v] where Proposition 1 must hold is always fixed (i.e. either v = v orv =v). this is that, as discussed in Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (b) ), an incentive efficient equilibrium must be regular with v = v = 0 andv <v, when c <v. Consequently, by Proposition 2, it must be that s( v) < 0, which is impossible. More generally, Proposition 2 shows how the assumption v = 0 may prevent regular equilibria of the subscription game from achieving specific theoretical bounds. This will be relevant for our analysis in Section 4. In this sense then, the assumption v = 0 is not a harmless normalization.
Piecewise-linear equilibria
The equilibrium characterization of the previous section is fairly general. Even if step-function equilibria are excluded by requiring s to be regular, a vast multiplicity of equilibria remains because the restrictions on the initial conditions v and s( v) in Proposition 1 are weak. 11 Indeed, v may be larger than v and, even when v equals v, s( v) is not uniquely determined except when v is zero. Moreover, in contrast to equilibrium derivation in the contribution game (see Barbieri and Malueg, forthcoming (a) ), to describe all regular equilibria it is not sufficient to truncate and translate a baseline functional form. For example, as shown by Laussel and Palfrey (2003) , for a given threshold t, different initial conditions yield different functional forms for different equilibria, even when valuations are uniformly distributed. Little progress 10 Laussel and Palfrey's semi-regular equilibria do have a flat spot at the top for s(v) = t and a flat spot at the bottom. Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (b) ) show this class of equilibria is empty.
11 Such restrictions become stronger when one focuses on regular equilibria with 0 < s (v) < ∞, as Martimort and Moreira (2007) show. seems possible without further simplifications. For this reason, we next turn to a special family of regular symmetric equilibria, those that are piecewise-linear. In particular, for v ∈ [ v,v] strategy s will be linear and strictly increasing, while on [v,v] it is constant.
12 For their eminent tractability, linear strategies have often been examined as a first step in the analysis of complex situations. More importantly, as we shall see, in our framework regular symmetric piecewise-linear equilibria have another desirable feature: they can maximize the collector's utility.
Admissible distribution functions
Where s is linear, equations (1) and (2) simplify considerably. The following lemmas characterize the class of distribution functions for which a regular symmetric piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy s can exist. For these distributions, the subsequent propositions show exactly when such equilibria exist, and in these cases they specify equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1. A regular symmetric piecewise-linear equilibrium exists only if the inverse hazard rate
Proof. If s is linear on ( v,v) , that is, s(v) = αv + β, then the definition of G and the boundary condition
Using G(G(v)) = v on the left-hand side of the previous equation and using
so that on ( v,v) the inverse hazard rate is indeed linear.
Lemma 1 restricts F only on ( v,v) , the interval where (1) holds (cf. footnote 7). If we require linearity of the inverse hazard rate over the full support [v,v] , simple integration yields the following lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. If the inverse hazard rate of F is linear on [v,v] , then F is either
The cdf given by (6) is simply an exponential distribution with support [v, ∞); the cdf given by (7) we refer to as a "reverse power function" distribution.
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The following propositions, with proofs in the Appendix, apply Proposition 1 to characterize regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibria for the distributions of Lemma 2. The next proposition shows for exponential distributions that regular piecewise-linear equilibria are particularly simple. v−v) , where r > 0. A regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if v ≥ 1/r and t > 2(v − 1/r). In this case, v = v and the regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium strategy is given by
To see that the condition t > 2(v − 1/r) is needed, suppose instead that t < 2(v − 1/r) and player 1 uses the specified strategy. Then player 2 knows that if he follows the specified strategy, total contributions will strictly exceed t; consequently, player 2 would reduce his contribution, thus deviating from the specified strategy. We also see that for a piecewise-linear regular equilibrium to exist it must be that v ≥ 1/r, for otherwise the strategy in Proposition 3 specifies negative contributions. While it is tempting to truncate such a strategy at 0, the resulting strategy would not be part of an equilibrium. To understand this, note that types in [v, 1/r] then provide zero contributions; therefore, types whose specified contributions are just shy of t could, by increasing their contributions to t, obtain at very low additional cost a discrete increase in the probability that the good is provided and thereby enjoy a discrete increase in their payoffs. This requirement that v > 1/r shows the frequent assumption that the support of players' values begins at 0 is not without loss of generality.
For the reverse power function distribution, the description of equilibria is slightly more involved. For clarity, we distinguish between the high-threshold case in Proposition 4 and the low-threshold case in Proposition 5.
Proposition 4 (Equilibria for reverse power function distributions, high-threshold case).
, where r > 0 and 0 ≤ v <v < ∞, and assume
A regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if t < 2v. In this case, the regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium strategy is given by
According to Proposition 4, when the threshold is high and players use piecewise-linear strategies, only when a player's value is sufficiently large does he have a chance of receiving the good, and even then is not assured of enjoying it. In contrast, the next proposition shows that for a low threshold, when using piecewise-linear strategies all players have a chance of enjoying the good, and those with sufficiently high values are assured they will. Thus, the low-cost case is similar to that of the exponential distribution.
Proposition 5 (Equilibria for reverse power function distributions, low-threshold case). Suppose F is defined
A regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if
and
In this case, the regular piecewise-linear symmetric equilibrium strategy is given by
Though there typically exist multiple equilibria in the subscription game, we have focused on the (essentially unique) piecewise-linear regular equilibria as especially attractive. However, it may be that in some cases they do not exist. Nevertheless, we next show that when they do exist, piecewise-linear regular equilibria can maximize the seller's expected utility over all incentive compatible mechanisms. Additionally, for the exponential and reverse power function distributions, we show that when such equilibria do not exist, the subscription game cannot maximize the collector's utility.
4 Optimal provision of a discrete public good: an application of linear equilibrium strategies
We begin this section by allowing the collector the choice of any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism for providing the public good. We will then show how, when regular piecewise-linear equilibria exist, the subscription game (sometimes with a slight modification) implements the allocation that maximizes the collector's utility.
The utility-maximizing direct mechanism
The seller's utility-maximization problem can be solved adapting Myerson's (1981) optimal auction design.
By the Revelation Principle it suffices to consider only direct mechanisms that are feasible: both incentive compatible and individually rational. Direct mechanisms are triples of functions (p, v,v] . Players simultaneously report values v 1 and v 2 ; then x i (v 1 , v 2 ) is player i's payment to the seller and
is the probability the good is provided. The only difference with Myerson (1981) is that, because we are dealing with a public good, p is not indexed by players. The seller is risk neutral, with profit x 1 + x 2 − c when the good is provided and profit 0 when it is not. Moreover, we allow the seller to attach weight ρ ∈ [0, 1) to the contributors' payoffs. When ρ ∈ (0, 1), the seller is in part altruistic, taking into account not only his profit, but also the players' utility. In sum, the collector's problem is to maximize
over all feasible direct mechanisms. Cornelli (1996) analyzed this problem with ρ = 0, that is, for a profit-maximizing seller. A straightforward adaptation of Cornelli's argument yields the following.
Lemma 3 (Cornelli, 1996) .
is increasing on [v,v] , then a utility-maximizing
Next we connect a player's conditional expected payment to the function p in a feasible mechanism.
Assuming truthful revelation by player 2, player 1's expected payoff when announcing v a is
where
Analogous formulas apply for player 2. In the truth-telling equilibrium, conditional on v i , P i (v i ) is player i's perceived probability the good will be provided and X i (v i ) is his expected payment to the seller. Let
be player i's payoff in the truth-telling equilibrium of a feasible direct mechanism.
Incentive compatibility requires
The Envelope Theorem gives dU *
i is nondecreasing. Therefore, an incentive compatible mechanism is individually rational if and only if U * i (v) ≥ 0. As Myerson (1981) and Cornelli (1996) show, the seller's utility maximization requires this constraint to bind. The utility-maximizing conditional expected payment can be found by integrating (16) with the boundary condition ensuring U *
Expected cost is c times the probability the good is provided. 12
Utility maximization in the subscription game
For implementation purposes, we slightly modify the standard subscription game. First, with binding commitment, the collector announces the threshold t and an individual's non-refundable entry fee ϕ. Next, after observing the realization of their own private values, contributors independently and simultaneously decide whether to pay ϕ. If either contributor does not pay the entry fee, the game ends. If both pay ϕ, the game moves to the third stage, in which contributors play the standard subscription game: players simultaneously contribute any amount; these contributions are refunded if they total less than t but otherwise are retained by the collector. Only in the latter case does the collector provide the good, incurring cost c.
The next propositions show that, when piecewise-linear regular equilibria exist, the collector can choose t and ϕ so that his utility in the modified subscription game coincides with his utility in the optimal direct mechanism described in Section 4.1. In turn, we will reference the necessary and sufficient conditions in Propositions 3, 4, and 5. Given threshold t, we will take the corresponding equilibria described in Propositions 3, 4, and 5 to be the continuation equilibria after players pay the entry fee ϕ. We first consider the exponential distribution in (6), for which w(v) = v − (1 − ρ)/r is increasing in v, so Lemma 3 applies.
Straightforward calculations show that when c ≤ 2(v − (1 − ρ)/r) the collector optimally provides the public good with probability one, and charges 2v. This can be easily accomplished in our modified subscription game by setting the entry fee ϕ = v and the threshold t = 0 (or ϕ = 0 and t = 2v). For higher costs, the following proposition shows how the collector obtains the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism.
Proposition 6 (Utility maximization: exponential distributions). v−v) , where r > 0 and v ≥ 1/r. Assume further that c > 2(v − (1 − ρ)/r). Through the modified subscription game, the collector can obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1 by setting the contribution threshold at t = c−2ρ/r and the nonrefundable entry fee at ϕ = e −2(1−ρ)−cr+2vr /r.
The continuation equilibrium is described in (8).
Our proof uses Myerson's (1981) Revenue Equivalence Theorem. For given c, if t is chosen so the provision region in the subscription game matches that in the corresponding optimal mechanism, then the probability a player obtains the good conditional on his value (P i (v i ) in the notation of Section 4.1) is the same in both settings.
14 By Myerson's result, each player's expected payments will then be the same in both regimes if the player with value v earns the same conditional expected payoff (namely 0) in both settings. We set the entry fee ϕ to make this so, leaving players willing to pay ϕ. Because provision regions coincide, expected costs are identical.
Proof of Proposition 6. As noted above,
, so the utilitymaximizing direct mechanism provides the good exactly where
Now consider the provision region for the regular equilibrium of Proposition 3. As given in (8), s(v) = v − 1/r for all v ≤v = t − v + 2/r, and the good is provided if and only if v 1 + v 2 ≥ t + 2/r. Therefore, to match the two provision regions, the subscription game threshold is set at t = c − 2ρ/r. If no entry fee were required, the payoff to the lowest type would be
Therefore, to extract all surplus from the lowest-value type, the entry fee is set to e −2(1−ρ)−cr+2vr /r.
It is worth noting that Proposition 6 covers the case 2(v − (1 − ρ)/r) < c ≤ 2v, where a fully efficient equilibrium of the subscription game exists. Indeed, because c ≤ 2v, the contributors' asymmetric information is irrelevant for efficiency purposes: it is common knowledge that the good should always be provided and both contributors are willing to contribute c/2 regardless of their private information. Nonetheless, as long as ρ < 1, the collector finds it more desirable to restrict the probability of provision as described in Proposition 6. This behavior of the collector is analogous to that of a monopolist restricting the quantity supplied to increase the price charged and to the imposition of a reserve price in optimal auctions.
While for the exponential distribution piecewise-linear regular equilibria do not exist when v < 1/r, there may well exist nonlinear equilibria continuous on [ v,v] . We next show no such equilibria of the (modified) subscription game yield the same utility as the optimal mechanism. Thus, without restricting attention to linear strategies, the following proposition provides a converse to the previous result. v−v) , where r > 0 and v < 1/r. For any continuation equilibrium of the subscription game, the collector cannot obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1.
Proof. Applying Lemma 3, we obtain that the provision region in the optimal mechanism is where v 1 + v 2 ≥ c + 2/r. If an equilibrium of the subscription game can match this provision region it must have G (v) = −1, so G(v) = k 1 − v for some constant k 1 , where G is defined in Proposition 1. Equation (1) then reduces to
a solution to this differential equation must have the form
for some constant k 2 . When k 2 = 0 one obtains our earlier candidate for a linear-strategy equilibrium.
However, because v < 1/r, Proposition 3 implies this is not an equilibrium strategy. When k 2 = 0, constancy v,v] implies that, for some constant k 3 ,
differentiation with respect to v implies e −rv = e −r(k1−v) , which cannot be satisfied for an interval of v's.
Hence, there is no equilibrium with k 2 = 0.
Combining Propositions 6 and 7, the following corollary provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the subscription game to maximize the collector's utility when values have an exponential distribution. v−v) , where r > 0. Assume further that c > 2(v − (1 − ρ)/r). Through the modified subscription game the collector can obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism if and only if v ≥ 1/r.
We next consider reverse power function distributions. Lemma 3 again applies, and straightforward calculations show that when cr ≤ 2(((1 − ρ) + r)v − (1 − ρ)v) (the low-cost case), the collector optimally provides the public good with probability one and charges 2v-there are many ways to implement this allocation via the subscription game. For cr > 2(((1 − ρ) + r)v − (1 − ρ)v) it is convenient to distinguish two cases. We begin with the high-cost case. (The proofs of the remaining propositions follow the logic of those of Propositions 6 and 7 and can be found in the Appendix.)
Proposition 8 (Utility maximization: reverse power distributions, high cost). Suppose F is defined on [v,v] by
, where r > 0 and 0 ≤ v <v < ∞. Assume further that c satisfies v((1 − ρ) + r) + (r − (1 − ρ))v ≤ cr < 2vr. Through the modified subscription game, the collector can obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1 by setting the contribution threshold at
and the nonrefundable entry fee at ϕ = 0. The continuation equilibrium is described in (10).
Observe that in the high-cost case, the unmodified subscription game is optimal-an entry fee need not be charged. This is because types near v have no chance of obtaining the good and therefore earn zero surplus. For lower costs of production the seller can be expected to set a lower threshold; once the type-v contributor has a chance of obtaining the good, an entrance fee must be added to ensure this contributor is left with no surplus. Nevertheless, turning to the medium-cost case, we note that the functional form of the optimal threshold is the same as in the high-cost case.
Proposition 9 (Utility maximization: reverse power distributions, medium cost). Suppose F is defined
, where r > 0 and 0 ≤ v <v < ∞. Assume further that c satisfies
then, through the modified subscription game, the collector can obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1 by setting the contribution threshold at
and the nonrefundable entry fee at
The continuation equilibrium is described in (14).
Our analysis has implications for the study by Alboth et al. (2001) , who consider a seller of a discrete public good facing two contributors whose individual values are independently and uniformly distributed over [0, 1] . The seller's cost of production is zero. Setting a threshold t that total contributions must reach before the good is provided, the seller expects to earn positive revenue in the Bayesian equilibrium of the subscription game. Given t < 2, Alboth et al. derive the unique symmetric equilibrium in which a player's strategy is a strictly increasing, continuously differentiable function of his own value, having range [0, t].
(Thus, every equilibrium they derive has v = 0 andv = 1.) Varying threshold t they seek the corresponding equilibrium that maximizes expected revenue; revenue is so maximized at t = 1/2, achieving value 1/3; and the associated equilibrium strategy is s then the subscription game yields the profit of the optimal mechanism when the threshold is set at t = 1/2, the entry fee is ϕ = 0, and players use strategy s(v) = v/2. Thus, not only is the equilibrium Alboth et al.
derive profit-maximizing in the subscription game, no other mechanism yields greater profit. For t = 1/2 the equilibria Alboth et al. derive are highly nonlinear and apparently give provision regions without the linear boundary found in an optimal mechanism, and therefore would seem not to maximize the seller's profit over all incentive compatible mechanisms.
15 To see this is indeed the case, note that in the equilibria of Alboth et al., where strategies are strictly increasing throughout, all types in (0, 1] have a strictly positive probability of obtaining the good. However, for ρ = 0, so that the seller maximizes profits, and c ∈ (0, 2), the optimal mechanism specifies that players with value v ∈ [0, c/2) have zero chance of obtaining the good.
16
Thus, the provision regions of the optimal mechanism and the equilibria of Alboth et al. do not match, implying by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem that the revenues are not equal.
Analogous to Proposition 7, our final proposition for the subscription game provides for the reverse power function distribution the same kind of converse result to the optimality of linear strategies: if piecewise-linear regular strategies do not exist, then the (modified) subscription game cannot maximize the collector's utility.
, where r > 0 and 0 ≤ v <v < ∞.
Assume further that 2(((
and cr <v(r + ρ − 1) − vr(1 + r − ρ), then, for any continuation equilibrium of the subscription game, the collector cannot obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1.
Combining Propositions 8-10, the following corollary provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the subscription game to maximize the collector's utility when values have a reverse power function distribution.
Through the modified subscription game the collector can obtain the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism if and only ifv ≤ (2 + r)v or
The results of this section display natural comparative statics properties. One may easily verify that the optimal threshold t is increasing in the cost c and decreasing in the altruism parameter ρ. To understand this note than an increase in c requires a smaller optimal provision region, which is achieved in the subscription 15 Similarly, with a uniform distribution of values, the contribution game cannot be optimal (even when c = 0, the case of Alboth et al.) as the continuous equilibria have a provision region bounded by a hyperbola (Barbieri and Malueg, forthcoming (a) ).
16 To see this, recall that for values uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and ρ = 0, the optimal mechanism provides the good if and only if v 1 + v 2 ≥ 1 + c/2. game with an increase in t. An increase in ρ gives greater weight to players' welfare, and intuitively the provision region should be increased; indeed, the optimal provision region expands and this is achieved with a reduction in t. The results for the optimal entry fee ϕ have the opposite sign of those for t. They are driven by the requirement U * i (v) = 0 in Section 4.1 (this requirement arises from ρ < 1). Indeed, a smaller threshold t implies a larger utility for type v, so that the entry fee must increase to ensure that the utility of the lowest type remains zero. It is worth mentioning that, when ρ = 0, the collector's ex post profit is positive: The optimal threshold is always larger than the cost of production c. Intuitively, as ρ increases, the collector's profit becomes negative for some combinations of valuations: The collector itself becomes a contributor to the public good. Actually, even the ex ante expected profit becomes negative as ρ grows large, as implied 
Utility maximization in the contribution game
Our analysis so far has shown that, for the family of distribution functions characterized by a linear inverse hazard rate, the subscription game admits equilibria that maximize the collector's utility. Importantly, this result holds for an interval of provision costs c and for all altruism parameters ρ ∈ [0, 1). A natural question is whether a similar result can be obtained for the closely related contribution game. A negative answer would provide a meaningful comparison of the contribution and subscription games, beyond the existing efficiency comparisons in the literature, which are inconclusive. For example, Menezes et al. (2001) show classical inefficiency of both subscription and contribution games, while Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (a)) show interim incentive efficiency for both subscription and contribution games, respectively, albeit only for a uniform distribution of valuations and for different ranges of c.
Once one rules out the trivial case in which the collector chooses to provide the good with probability 1, Lemma 3 implies that we can restrict attention to continuous and symmetric equilibria of the contribution game in our quest to match the optimal provision region, as discussed above (cf. footnote 14). To rule out uninteresting cases, for the remainder we assume optimal provision of the good occurs with probability strictly between 0 and 1. From Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (a)) one can then immediately see why the choice of the contribution game cannot maximize the seller's utility if either v = 0 or w(v) + w(v) < c.
In the first case, under the assumption f (v) > 0, no continuous equilibrium strategy exists. In the second, the optimal provision region specifies that types close to v should receive the public good with probability zero, but this is inconsistent with existence of a continuous equilibrium of the contribution game. This inconsistency arises because a continuous equilibrium of the contribution game must have v = v, for if this were not the case, it would imply that the contributions of types v andv total less than the threshold t (recall c > w(v) =v). By continuity of the equilibrium strategy then, there exists a player with value v ∈ (v, v) that contributes a strictly positive amount with no expectation of the project being completed. Therefore we obtain a contradiction to equilibrium, since type v has a profitable deviation to a contribution of zero because insufficient contributions are not refunded.
A closer inspection of the characterization result in Proposition 1 in Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (a)) yields the following additional necessary condition, with proof in the Appendix, for the contribution game to maximize the utility of a seller with altruism parameter ρ.
Proposition 11 (Utility maximization: contribution game). Assume f is strictly positive on [v,v) and consider some c m > 0 and some > 0. Suppose that, for all c ∈ (c m − , c m + ), there exists an equilibrium of the contribution game such that a seller with altruism parameter ρ receives the same utility as in the optimal direct mechanism in Section 4.1. Then the distribution function F (v) solves
, where w is defined in Lemma 3.
The differential equation in Proposition 11 may be used to show that, for the exponential and reverse power function distributions, the contribution game is never optimal for the seller, in contrast to the subscription game. More importantly, equation (17) shows that the distribution function for which the contribution game may be optimal depends on the specific value of ρ, as the following lemma, with proof in the Appendix, shows.
Proposition 12. There exists no distribution function F independent of ρ and satisfying the assumptions of Section 4.1, namely w (v) > 0, such that F solves (17) for an open set of ρ's.
Therefore, as soon as one requires optimality for not just a single value of the altruism parameter, as is reasonable in judging the properties of mechanisms like the contribution or subscription games, Proposition 11
implies that the contribution game cannot be optimal. This is a sharp contrast with the subscription game, as demonstrated in the previous section. The difference stems from the different treatment of insufficient contributions. The full-refund feature of the subscription game generates greater latitude for the collector.
Indeed, through the careful choice of the threshold t described in the previous section, different optimal provision regions induced by changes in the cost c and by different values of ρ may be jointly accommodated in the subscription game. In contrast, because insufficient contributions are not refunded, equilibria are more tightly determined in the contribution game, especially if continuity of equilibrium strategies is required.
Therefore, the contribution game is a far less flexible mechanism for the collector than is the contribution game. One instance of this inflexibility of the contribution game was noted above, namely, that equilibrium requires v = v. Similarly, restrictions can be derived for the slope of the contribution function, as Barbieri and Malueg (forthcoming (a)) and Menezes et al. (2001) show. Such restrictions are key to the proof of Proposition 11.
Conclusion
In the symmetric subscription game, piecewise-linear regular equilibria exist for the exponential and reverse 
is optimal it must satisfy the following first-order optimization condition almost everywhere
which is (1). Differentiating the defining equation for G, we obtain almost everywhere s (v)+s (G(v))G (v) = 0, which is (2). To show that (1) and (2) must hold everywhere on ( v,v), we use G(G(v)) = v and rearrange (1) and (2) as
is the hazard rate function associated with F . Because s, G, and h are continuous on ( v,v) , it follows from the right-hand side of (18) If v > v, then two additional conditions must be satisfied. First, it is necessary that
for if s( v) < v then types in [v, v) sufficiently near v could profitably deviate to a contribution of s( v).
Second, it must be that
so that players contributing the maximum cannot, by ensuring the project is provided, strictly increase their payoffs with a contribution of t rather than s(v), thus establishing (4).
Sufficiency: Now we show that conditions (1)- (4) suffice to characterize a regular symmetric equilibrium.
To show that the first-order condition (1) actually identifies a best response, first observe that for any
where the second equality follows from (1) v,v) , achieving a maximum at s(v a ) = s(v). By continuity of s (in v) and U (in s and v), s is also optimal for v = v,v. Thus, we have shown that over the interval of v,v] . It remains to show s(v) is globally optimal for all v,v] . A contribution less than s( v) implies the good will not be provided and the corresponding payoff is 0; hence, given (3), such a contribution is not strictly better than s(v). A contribution in the interval (s(v), t) does not increase the probability of provision beyond contributing s(v) as all types v < v contribute 0. Therefore, the only other deviation from s(v) to consider is t, which would ensure the good is provided.
However, we see that, for any
showing a deviation to t is not profitable. is optimal for typev and, as is easily shown, larger types will want to contribute at least as much as typev, deviations to levels below s(v) are not profitable for types v ∈ (v,v].
As for types in [v, v) , they can exist only when v > v. In this case, s( v) = v by condition (4) so types in [v, v) find it optimal to contribute any amount less than s( v), in order to avoid triggering completion with some positive probability and thereby realizing a strictly negative payoff. Therefore, we can set their contributions to zero. This establishes that s(v) is optimal for all v.
Proof of Proposition 2. By contradiction assume that, for some t > 0, (s, s) is a regular equilibrium with s( v) = v andv <v. Then, it must satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1. Define G : [ v,v] → [ v,v] as in Proposition 1. Then G is strictly decreasing and continuous, with G( v) =v and G( v) =v. After algebraic manipulations and using G(G(v)) = v, conditions (1) and (2) may be written as
where On the one hand, since G is bounded, for v ∈ [ v, v 0 ] we have
On the other hand, for v ∈ ( v, v 0 ] we have
showing (22) is violated for v close to v. This contradiction implies (s, s) cannot be a regular equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the equation for a linear inverse hazard rate
which can be restated as
If γ = 0, then δ > 0 and integration of (23) yields
where λ is a constant of integration. The condition F (v) = 0 implies λ = v/δ, so
where r = 1/δ > 0; and the condition lim v→v F (v) = 1 impliesv = +∞.
If γ = 0, integration of (23), along with the boundary conditions F (v) = 0 and F (v) = 1, yields
for some r = 0. Since F must be increasing, we have r > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof applies Proposition 1. If s(v) = αv+β on [ v,v] , then G(v) = (t−2β)/α−v so equation (2) is satisfied. If F is given in (6), then (as in (5)) equation (1) becomes
which is satisfied if and only if α = 1 and β = − 1 r .
Therefore, on [ v,v] a regular piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy must be s(v) = αv + β = v − 1 r ; consequently, the necessary condition s( v) = v if v > v can never be satisfied, implying by (4) that v = v. Because contributions must be non-negative, we have
Finally, the condition s( v) + s(v) = t implicitly definesv aŝ
The requirement thatv > v yields
Conditions (26) and (27) 
which is satisfied if and only if
Therefore, on [ v,v] a regular piecewise-linear equilibrium strategy must be
By the definition of G, we must have
or, using (30),
which can be rewritten as v +v = 1 + r 2 + r t + 2v 2 + r > (2 + r)v + rv 2 + r + 2v 2 + r (by (9)) =v + v;
and, sincev ≤v it follows that v > v. When v > v, the necessary condition s( v) = v applies, and using (30) we obtainv =v. Therefore, v is implicitly determined by s( v) + s(v) = t, yielding
In order for the last expression to belong to (v,v) it must be that defines the high-threshold case. Using (30), the necessary condition that s( v) = v now impliesv =v, so the candidate equilibrium strategy is given by (10). This strategy has properties a-d of Proposition 1 and satisfies the sufficient conditions (1)-(3). To complete the proof, it only remains to show that (4) is also satisfied. Because t = s(v) + s( v) = s(v) + v, the remaining condition in (4) can be rewritten
which, after substituting for F and rearranging terms, becomes
Consequently, we havev
andv
so, to show that (32) is satisfied when v > v, we need to show
Consider the function
on the left-hand side of (35). Its derivative with respect to t is
it follows that (36) is strictly increasing in t for t > (2+r)v+rv 1+r
. Therefore, for any t > (2+r)v+rv 1+r
we have
Using ( which is equivalent to using (14) . Therefore, we just need to verify conditions (12) and (13) of Proposition 5 are satisfied. When v − v(2 + r) > 0, (13) is obviously satisfied, so we verify that t ≥ r 1 + r (v − v(2 + r)), which, after substitution for the optimal t, reduces to cr >v(r + ρ − 1) − vr(1 + r − ρ), and this condition is required by the statement of this Proposition. Whenv − v(2 + r) < 0, (12) is obviously satisfied, so we verify that t ≥ − 2 1 + r (v − v(2 + r)), which, after substitution for the optimal t, yields cr > 2v (1 + r − ρ) − 2(1 − ρ)v, and this condition is equivalent to the assumption that the collector does not produce the good with probability one in the optimal mechanism: cr > 2((1 − ρ) + r)v − 2(1 − ρ)v. Thus, (12) and (13) where k 2 is another constant of integration. Note that k 2 must be strictly smaller than 1, for F to represent a meaningful probability distribution. Substituting these values into the definition of z we obtain
therefore,
which satisfies the differential equation z (v) = 0 only if k 2 = 1. As noted above, this value is not admissible if F is to represent a probability distribution, and we obtain a contradiction.
